The Agnostic Brexiteer

Nothing has changed.

Brexit is one of my least favourite things to talk about, but like that cousin who is constantly planning some hair-brained scheme, it always finds its way back into the conversation. One thing I have found very positive about Brexit, I will admit, is how healthy it has been for our political discourse. I’m sure a great many people will disagree with that diagnosis, but I can only speak from my experience: when one is willing to listen, to politely challenge, and to accept that in times of great uncertainty – political or otherwise – all ideas may hold some water, the true colours of this country emerge.

Some of these ideas I vehemently disagree with. But, and this is hardly an original critique, there is little to be gained from embracing one’s tendency towards the ideas of those whom you agree with. I have spoken to a journalist from a true blue constituency who sees common incompetence amongst all politicians; I have spoken to a die-hard Labour supporter who felt Hilary Benn was the solution to all our problems; in a Wetherspoons I engaged in a fascinating discussion with a retired lawyer who, several decades prior, claimed to have predicted the raise of the European project, and saw Brexit as the solution. That last person was, if you’re curious, self-described as, “not a liberal.”

I have heard the arguments for Lexit, discussing, and often agreeing with, the arguments that the European Union is a deeply undemocratic, protectionist set of institutions, and I have preached my own diagnosis of this situation. Namely, we as a nation are trapped in a Churchillian national mythos which has left us unable to accurately understand the United Kingdom’s place in the world.

These discussions I consider invaluable. Indeed, I urge everyone to engage with others, be it about Brexit or other ideas. Nothing aids us in understanding our perspective on the world better than by understanding someone else’s. My issue, returning to Brexit, is this: despite all this discourse, positive or otherwise; despite all the rhetoric, the commentary and the sassy comments; despite all the debate, argument and legislating here and in Europe; despite all these things, nothing has changed.

Perhaps that’s because, in the most perverse way possible, Theresa May is genuine in her convictions (nothing has changed is personally my favourite of Mrs. May’s quotes), but we will return to her in due course. Let’s begin with the recent votes in parliament.

The government’s withdrawal agreement has been rejected. Everyone considered this outcome obvious – even the government back in December. This evening, the deal has passed… with an amendment that demands the now infamous backstop be removed and the withdrawal agreement altered to facilitate this change. Of course, Ireland specifically and the EU more broadly are refusing to reopen the question of the backstop or renegotiate the withdrawal agreement. So, once again, nothing has changed.

Let’s think about this. Brexit was, by definition, a vote for change. Whether one agrees with that change or not, the apparently inevitable goal of the vote was to catalyse a systematic change in British politics, if not the British state. Of course, I say apparently inevitable. The reality has been a combination of encouraging bluster while establishment forces which produced the referendum have crystallised. The bluster was necessary, if really a con – as long as the discourse continued, and twitter accounts and news commentators were occupied with what often amounted to little more than gossip, the technocratic business of fixing what should have never been broken could be carried out.

That is a tremendous shame. We can all criticise the process of the 2016 referendum, and in hindsight a series of referenda were probably the best way to tackle this question. But hindsight is irrelevant when one faces chaos and carnage. In time, I have come to understand why some people voted in contrary to myself, to the extent that I dub myself (and I would dub many others) an agnostic Brexiteer. To be sure, anyone that has bought into this country is now a Brexiteer, for we all have an opinion on how we leave (even if that opinion is we don’t).

The agnostic part is that which I wish to linger on. In recent days I have stopped trying to predict what will happen with Brexit, and with this country. Not necessarily because I was frequently incorrect; but because, in the sheer honest light of day, no one knows how to Brexit. While a sad indictment of our current state of affairs, I believe an appeal to theological parallels is the most appropriate course of action. Democracy is, like almost everything else which commands the souls of people, the result of belief.

Nothing has changed because nothing can change. To pull one way rather than another does not simply risk tearing the Tory party apart or tearing Remain from Leave. The intricate web of social groups and ideas which make up contemporary Britain face decimation. It seems rational then, in such an environment, to display the level of intransigence the Prime Minister has. If fundamentally the role one occupies is predicated on the existence of a state, one would be unwise to risk the state’s destruction.

I may be accused of hyperbole, but I think such an accusation would be short-sighted. It has long been my belief Brexit has little to do with Europe, and more to do with economic disfranchisement, technological rapidity and societal changes. In other words, bog standard populism. As above, Brexit was a call for change, for upheaval. For control, of which the previously listed populist symptoms too frequently render in short supply.

When nothing has changed, that means nothing has changed. The forces and fears of economics and politics have not changed, nor having living standards, or job security, or wages, or – to put it simply – basic prospects for opportunity. This, more than anything, is why there is no solution to Brexit. The social turmoil and strife which plagues communities, both here and abroad, must first be tackled before the diplomatic behemoths of Brexit, of trade, of climate change and globalisation can be tackled.

Doing so will not be easy, hence why I believe the term agnostic Brexiteer is a useful one. How do we Brexit? How do we rebuild trust, cohesion and opportunity in our communities? How do we restore a sense of democracy and equality into that thing we call our democracy? How, on the most basic level, do we move forward together in any direction? This has always been a challenge of statecraft, but the arrogance of the end of history has left these questions to linger, and now voices, via radically different effigies, demand answers.

In the face of these challenges, which I believe leave many of us unsure how to proceed, the theory of nothing has changed will surely not suffice.

Why I (Currently) Believe a No-Deal is Unlikely

Theresa May started her premiership with a lie. Or, at least, an implied mistruth. Whilst many debated the content of the statement, “No deal is better than a bad deal,” almost everyone missed the point. Politically, for Theresa May, no-deal is the worst deal.

This is why I believe a no-deal outcome is (currently) unlikely to occur.

Let us step back a moment and unpack this situation, because it does not take much pontificating to realise no-deal is not universally politically bad. In the short-term, such a scenario would satisfy the hard Brexiteers (though I stress in the short-term; in the long-term it is less clear how beneficial no-deal would be to this sect) and may extend political capital. Additionally, if the chaos that is forecast comes to pass, those campaigning for a second referendum will feel validated, if not invigorated. Whilst they might deny this – less they be accused of complacency in this outcome – it is the reality.

The third group to consider are those backing the Prime Minister’s Chequers agreement. By pitching this plan as the last workable option, this group seeks to rally support for the plan. Yet with dissenters on both sides, such a pitch demands we re-evaluate the ground on which we stand: if the Chequer’s agreement is the only deal that can be done, surely the only alternative is a no-deal?

It is the jockeying of hard Brexiteers on the one hand, and advocates of a second referendum on the other, that is propelling this narrative about no-deal. And the media, though rightly evaluating and informing of the consequences of a no-deal, wrongly projects significance onto the meagre odds of such an outcome espoused by those with their own agendas.

Let us remember this Prime Minister’s agenda. Theresa May was a Remainer; I am confident that she desires to be more than just a Brexit Prime Minister. Brexit, in lieu of her legacy, will be an inevitable cornerstone. Yet I see little reason to believe Brexit is all she desires to achieve, and – from the Prime Minister’s perspective – it seems hard to not characterise Brexit as that thing that simply need be achieved before the regular business of governing can begin. No-deal is not an option, because it is almost by definition an admittance of her failure.

This should be obvious. Whilst it is necessary to retain the rhetoric of walking away, the purpose of a negotiation is to reach a negotiated position. Should Theresa May fail to do so, she will have failed in her primary task as Prime Minister, and her remaining in the position will be untenable. Alternatively, consider the reality of a no-deal; a no-deal represents a breakdown in negotiations, not a satisficing of those things which need be negotiated. In other words, sooner or later the UK would have to negotiate with the EU again, over one matter or another. Would this country really entrust a Prime Minister who failed in the primary negotiation to lead secondary or tertiary negotiations?

A no-deal demands Theresa May’s resignation, and if we have learnt anything of Theresa May this past year or more, it is that she is not easily displaced.

I am not sure, either, whether the Conservative party realise the political damage a no-deal would do to them. Whether or not the average Tory voter is inclined to see a no-deal outcome as beneficial, they must surely concede their elected party has failed in its aim. This will be the narrative that dominates the party for the foreseeable future; the failure that calls into question the would-be party of competency.

If there is any entity that I consider more desperate to cling to power than Theresa May, it is perhaps the Conservative party as a whole.

We could play around with a scenario for a moment: that Theresa May, stoic in her resolve, walks away at the eleventh hour claiming such an action was the duty of any good Prime Minister given the villainous proposal on which the EU would not compromise. This, I concede, might score some points in her party. But it would be an obvious change in tone, one that no one would truly believe. It would not mask the sense of failure; it would not protect the party.

I do not deny the possibility of a no-deal, and to do so I think would be foolish. But rather than get caught up in the hysteria of a no-deal apocalypse, let us refocus our attention on the politics of this matter. A no-deal would be disastrous for the Prime Minister, and the Conservative party. Even those who would like to see the former gone will often find themselves exposed to the latter. It is for these reasons I (currently) do not think a no-deal will happen.

A Second Referendum is not a Solution

The problem with vapid statements is they work only as placeholders, and cannot exist as anything beyond meaningless soundbites – except, maybe, in the form of a joke. A wonderful example of such a statement is Theresa May’s, “Brexit means Brexit,” which, this country has come to discover in recent days/weeks/months (I guess it depends how much obnoxious foresight one wishes to prescribe to themselves) isn’t quite sufficient to negotiate one of the most complicated diplomatic de-couplings in history. The effectiveness of, “Brexit means Brexit,” at least initially, stems from the same syllogistic logic that 1 = 1. The difference, however, is that most people know what the number 1 means.

It is not that people – be it politicians or pundits or the public – do not know what Brexit means per se; we all know that Brexit means the United Kingdom leaving the European Union. Rather, the problem is the question of how we leave the European Union – stumbling drunkenly out of the club reciting an infamous retort of Bender from Futurama; or thanking everyone on our way out for giving us such a lovely time, before sending them a Facebook friend request.

Such analogies for a hard and soft Brexit might sound dumb, but frankly, they are as valid as any other description of our current negotiating debate. Do not misunderstand me: it is not that people do not know what they are doing, it is that nobody seems able to agree on whose nicely typeset and grammar checked proposal should be put through the Westminster meat-grinder this week, and whose should live to die another day.

This, “majority for nothing,” situation is what has caused the former education secretary Justine Greening to add her voice to the increasing numbers calling for a people’s vote on the final Brexit outcome (why exactly they are calling it a people’s vote and not a referendum, beyond the benefits such linguistic wizardry may provide in a PR battle, is beyond me). I have previously written about a potential second referendum, to an extent advocating for it, and I will not shy away from grounding my thoughts on Ms. Greening’s proposal in my previously held position. But first, let us lay out what is being proposed:

• There will be three options available: a clean break (no-deal), a facilitated customs arrangement (FCA; Mrs. May’s Chequers plan) and the option to remain in the EU.
• Voters will be given a primary and secondary vote, allowing them to vote for two of the above options – essentially showing their ranked preference of all three options – which will ensure the option that wins has a majority backing.

Insofar as such an incendiary thing as a second referendum goes, I like Ms. Greening’s initial proposal, and her rationale for proposing it. Whilst a Remainer, this referendum feels less like an obvious Remainer coup masquerading as devolved democracy than previous calls might have done. The proposal certainly tries – though, may not succeed – to ensure the vote spells out a more specific arrangement than the 2016 referendum question achieved. Finally, at least theoretically, the primary and secondary vote structure brings clarity to the country’s preference, and again helps dissuade criticism that this is just a Remainer coup.

On that latter, and indeed immediately former point of praise, I have heard criticism, however. Some might argue that two leave options and only one remain option will split the leave vote, biasing the vote towards remain. This may be true of a vote consisting of only one elected choice, but with a primary and secondary choice, such criticism appears to be a misunderstanding of reality. A leaver, we might presume, will vote for both leave options (the exact preference does not matter). Yet a Remainer, whose primary vote will support remaining in the EU, will have to (provided single-elective votes are not counted, which, given this is all presently hypothetical, I must assume) vote for a leave option as their secondary choice. Rather than such a referendum being biased towards Remain, this referendum proffers a Leave sentiment.

This, in turn, leads to a second curiosity to consider: who would win? To that it is hard to say, but I do offer an alternative proposition: the vote for a soft-Brexit (the FCA plan backed by Mrs. May’s) will dominate, and will muddy any outcome. This will be despite it  would be the public’s least preferred option. Here’s why.

Extend the rationale prescribed above. Those on the extremes of this debate, hard Brexiteers and Remainers, will of course favour no-deal and remain respectively. Their second elective, by demographic definition, must be for a soft-Brexit. On paper, thus, the only apparent agreeable consensus between these two groups is a soft-Brexit – they both said it was their secondary choice! In as long as it is short, this is the situation we presently find ourselves, and we are at an impasse. In terms of the extremes, this referendum will solve nothing.

Of course, the purpose of the referendum is to garner the opinions of the British people, and the majority of the British people are not on the extremes, at least insofar as they are willing to listen to argument and allow themselves to be convinced by it. But even a Remain-leaning voter, or a Leave-leaning voter, will most commonly select amongst their choices the soft-Brexit option (possibly as a first-choice, often as a second-choice).

The structure of this vote will inevitably polarise people (this is mathematical fact: if 1 and 3 represent polar opposite positions, and you must pick two numbers between 1 and 3, one foot must end up on an icecap), and thus the majority of people, whom we might assume are broadly split down the middle between the extreme positions, will appear most reconcilable around a soft-Brexit. Again, this accomplishes nothing.

Further, because the vote is inevitably polarising, I would predict the Remain and Leave campaigns, rather than a third soft-Brexit campaign, to dominant the narrative. In effect, then, this vote would be rendered a re-run of the last referendum, which has a smell of democratic-subversion. But this is not the point I would immediately like to make. Rather, my point is this: in such a referendum campaign, the number of individuals who elect, primarily or secondly, both no-deal and remain in, will be reduced, and thus the proliferation of a soft-Brexit vote will be facilitated. We might expect such a group of people to be small anyway, and that is true, but unless there is a strong core of supporters campaigning for a soft-Brexit, this group will get smaller. As an aside, if such hypothesising is true, it seems terribly offensive to the democratic process that the winning strategy might be to do nothing.

One should not ignore an additional line of inquiry, one that is somewhat ironic given my previous statement, that being that a soft-Brexit vote is one that most preserves democracy, by which I mean honours the outcome of the previous referendum. Of course, the no-deal option does so too; but I can imagine a compelling logic in the mind of the average voter that Brexit must happen, but it should not jeopardise various interests, and thus a soft-Brexit is preferential.

Let me clarify: I am not riling against a soft-Brexit outcome. Instead, I am arguing that a soft-Brexit outcome invalidates the whole reason for having the second referendum. I can see some reasoning, of course: one or both of the extreme sides of the Brexit debate may be side-lined as a result, less they be accused of subverting the democratic will. This might enable a majority in parliament for the FCA, or something similar. But a soft-Brexit arrangement, by its nature, would be a messy outcome, and thus anyone believing these groups would go quietly is deluding themselves; a soft-Brexit still leaves room for hard Brexiteers and Remainers to return. It still allows both sides to argue mass favour of, or dissention towards, the EU. Consider it another way: was the 2016 referendum not a clear-cut question that should have, in theory, silenced – or at least demobilised – those whose arguments lost? As it did not, what guarantees do we have that a second referendum, irrespective of outcome, will resolve the situation we find ourselves in?

If, then, this new referendum may devolve into a re-run of the last referendum; if the result may leave us exactly where we are; and if the new result may not guarantee parliamentary consensus; if all these things, why even have the referendum? The retort to these arguments is that we don’t know, and cannot know until run, what the outcome would be. I will not argue against such a retort, though I do not believe it invalidates the arguments I have raised. A second referendum is not a panacea.

Following my previous comments

I might be accused of being a hypocrite, given that sentence.

I have previously written about the prospect of a second referendum. In that piece, I argued Mrs. May could take a political gamble to strengthen her position in her own party, and perhaps in parliament. My proposal was simple: re-run the referendum, and side with Remain. The youth support so enamoured with Jeremy Corbyn would suddenly have a new champion – at least in terms of Brexit – in the form of Mrs. May, whilst the hard Brexiteers in her own party would be forced into an existential contest: win, or accept the PM’s authority. Of course, Mrs. May would also face an existential contest, for should she have lost she would have had to resign. This is why it was a gamble, and given Theresa May will surely have a promising career as a glue salesperson once her time in office is up, it was never one she was likely to take.

Ignoring Mrs. May’s FCA plan, this barrier to a second referendum remains. As the 2017 General election demonstrates, Mrs. May will not take a risk unless she believes herself likely to win.

But we cannot ignore the FCA; Mrs. May has made her bed, and she must now sleep in it. If my thoughts are right, nothing will change; if my thoughts are wrong, Mrs. May will have to resign. A second referendum now holds none of the advantages that it did prior to her unveiling her plan. When I hypothesised about the potential political benefits for Mrs. May of holding a second referendum, I considered only the political benefits, which – at the time – I believed existed. For Mrs. May, these benefits no longer exist, and thus she will not call another referendum.

Yet this is an obvious conclusion.

This conclusion is also simply mathematics: if there isn’t a consensus to get any Brexit plan through parliament, there is certainly not a majority to get a second referendum vote through parliament without (and possibly even with) the PM’s backing.

All of this Brexit debate, and I do mean all of it, points to the elephant in the room. Shaped by the rhetoric of the victors, too often there is a narrative that the country wants Brexit, that the country thinks Brexit will be bad for jobs, that the country wants control of its borders, that the country is concerned about leaving the single market. The only thing we can say about this country and Brexit is that 52% voted to leave the EU, and 48% voted to remain in the EU. For all the talk, for all the rhetoric and vitriol, if you want to know why we’re divided on Brexit, the answer is because we’re divided on Brexit. I am not confident a second referendum will change that.

Leviathan

This week marked the closest Theresa May has been to being removed as prime minister since her disastrous general election result in June. A now infamously bad speech, cabinet infighting and a general perception of her being weak have made her departure, in the eyes of many, inevitable, even if for the time being not immediately forthcoming.

Depending on who you ask (or, depending on the interviewee’s political leaning) the problem facing Mrs. May and the Conservative party in general is either Brexit, or a lack of clear, coherent and compassionate domestic policy. The discrepancy in reasoning is caused merely by respective actors emphasising their strengths – the issue is the same regardless: there is a lack of direction in Theresa May’s government.

This, in the opinion of many, will be fatal, if for no other reason than cool-headed reliability to do a task they have been asked to do is proudly promoted by many Conservatives as the modus operandi of the Tory party. A lack of direction, and by extension an inability to effectively deal with the tasks at hand, all serve to damage the party doubly as they damage the Conservatives the government and the brand.

This is why Theresa May is most certainly a dead woman walking. The very fact she is still walking is because the crisis facing the Tory party is systemic, rather than a sickness held in the head. The most likely candidate to replace her is Boris Johnson, eluding again to the behemoth of Brexit that is crushing this government and, it must be said, most of Westminster. An election of Boris as leader of would almost certainly smother some of the Brexit fires, but would leave other flames to burn out of control. It would also reinforce the perception that the Tories are out of touch; according to YouGov, he has never been more unpopular.¹

In what is now becoming a list of problems, the Conservatives find themselves with another: Mrs. May can’t lead but must, whilst Mr. Johnson can lead be must not. If we were to muse as to how to solve this problem, one might take it as a joke when I refer to a snake, but it is not. A leviathan in the context of history is one that unites various warring tribes through its singular might. Politicians might be snakes, but are any leviathans?

The apparent consensus is no, but that’s hardly creative thinking. Brexit has caused all of this mess, and perhaps it can fix it. Mrs. May faces an increasingly difficult task in leaving the European Union, whilst Brexiteers breathe down her throat, and the masses of young Remainers at home flock to Jeremy Corbyn. As a political move, calling a second referendum on Brexit may solve all three of these problems.

Assuming that, given the chance to vote again, a coalition of mobilised youth, terrified metropolitan elite and regretful middle-Englanders might reverse the result, Mrs. May may save her premiership. Talk of Brexit would be over, allowing her to focus on a strong domestic agenda and give her party an important sense of direction. Equally, it would cripple the hard Brexit wing of the party – including Mr. Johnson – through a shift to the centre ground. The result would be alienation for Boris and co.

Finally, Mr. Corbyn (whom I have spoken little about) would have his wind knocked out of his sails as his legions of supporters would, in a manner of speaking, side with the enemy. To put it another way, Mrs. May would be offering the young something only a prime minister could offer, and the young would be hard pressed to refuse.

As a solution, of course, it is not perfect. There would be accusations of old wounds opening (though, I would retort, that said wounds never closed) and it is certainly short-termist – the problem of Europe would continue to plague the Conservatives for years to come. But as I have written previously, this will be the case regardless.²

Though these are not the major flaw with this plan. The major flaw is the assumption that the result would be reversed. Just as Mr. Cameron did before her, losing the referendum would result in Mrs. May’s resignation. But so too will a ‘no deal,’ outcome, or simply a strategy of waiting it out. Mrs. May is on a collision course with failure, and only a risk might rectify that. If ever there was a time for bold and brave (if not necessarily strong and stable) leadership, let it be now. Call a second referendum.

¹ https://yougov.co.uk/opi/browse/Boris_Johnson

² http://stuartmmills.blogspot.co.uk/2017/07/how-do-you-solve-problem-like-brexit.html

Europe's Tug of War

The end of the European Union will not be on the back of Britain’s decision to leave it, regardless of what some members of the British political aristocracy might believe. But whether this nationalist arrogance is baseless or substantial is irrelevant. The illustrative point remains – nationalism will, eventually, kill the European Union.

Of course, it’s easy for a quite stereotypically British Remainer to say such a thing – it allows me to support my country by claiming the crumbling empire is not my country by their continent, whilst simultaneously bashing the abhorrent nationalistic overtones that consumed much of the Leave campaign’s media strategy (“take back control,” “Independence Day,” anybody?). However, the seeds of the European Union’s demise are not found in the dissent of little England, but instead within the textbooks of history.

Are we so far removed (or, perhaps, so democratically evolved?) to forget that 100 years ago Europe was embroiled in the (then) largest war in human history, only to then go and top that a couple of decades later? Or, choose more recent conflicts such as the Balkans in the 1990s, the Kosovo crisis and the return to genocide on European soil. These conflicts are borne out of national identity and the desire for self-determination – take back control could be applied to almost any European state at some point in that state’s history.

To believe, as many European technocrats and Remainers do, that the European Union is somehow a fundamental (and, by extension, permanent) entity is dubious at best. For what’s next for Europe but some sort of federalised state? The crisis in the Eurozone has shown the current model is tremendously fragile, and as reaction from Britain breaking away is it so mad as to think the European technocrats would call for closer integration between those that remain? And is the ultimate – perhaps extreme – outcome of this not something like the United States of Europe?

Such federalisation is unlikely because of nationalism, and the evidence is clear to see. A prime example is the calls for independence in Catalonia, which inevitably leads to a discussion of the Basque country. Or consider a 2015 Scotland, or even Kosovo should political forces move sufficiently. From the perspective of integration, take Turkey. The core part of what remains the sick man of Europe, those in Brussels seem to believe Turkey is sick, but certainly not European (Union, mind you). Lastly, take Switzerland – which is not even in the European Union – which consists of 26 federalised Cantons which operate quite independently.

History is expressed through our geography, which is itself expressed through colours on a map. Europe, for its size, is rather colourful. The question of why is because nationalistic beliefs dominate Europe, and have shaped the lay of the land (sometimes literally) when stressed. Though I think inaccurate, it is still a justifiable inquiry to say technocracy and loss of control in Europe stressed these tensions in Britain, resulting in Brexit. Further stresses – perhaps brought on by further integration – may lead to more Brexit scenarios popping up in the near future (a great example of this, in my opinion, is found in Emmanuel Macron, who is calling for a stronger European Union whilst his opponent in the election – Marine Le Pen – had a very Eurosceptic message. You could argue Macron is acting on a mandate, given he won. You could also argue Macron should be trying to convince those who didn’t vote for him, less they bite back next time).

The reverse – more decentralisation – is almost an admission of defeat. For those of us who want the European Union to survive, of which I am one, we must find another cure for the beast. That cure is not immediately forthcoming, but it should include the European Union rethinking its role within Europe the continent. If it continues to act as a self-actualising behemoth, it will fail to see the minute cracks until they become caverns.

How do you solve a problem like Brexit?

It is a natural British phenomenon to be simultaneously tremendously cynical and baselessly optimistic, particularly in matters of patriotism. This phenomenon is perhaps best illustrated with the Brexit negotiations David Davis started the end of June.

Though the left is wanton to brand Mr. Davis’s initial negotiations as wrought with concessions to his opposite, Michel Barnier, and the right keen to use words such as bilateral, professional and mutual, one should not ignore the fact that many do not believe these talks will result in a good result for the United Kingdom, regardless of political leaning.

In a week where Theresa May called for consensus, this is what I offer. Observe Mr. Farage’s comments after the general election result in early June, where he expressed concern that Brexit would not be done right. He even threatened to re-join front line politics, which is perhaps a more terrifying prospect than the often discussed cliff edge. Or, take Mr. Farage’s polar opposite, someone such as Vince Cable, who said on Andrew Marr that he felt Brexit might not even happen, given the challenges it presents.

In this landscape, I suggest it’s irrelevant whether Mr. Davis made concessions to the Europeans or not. The result of these negotiations is already determined, regardless of which side one is on. The deal will be bad. This is consensus, albeit to Mrs. May’s horror.

And make no mistake, there will be a deal. Whoever is prime minister in March 2019 (something that, at this time, seems extremely uncertain) must ensure there is a deal with the EU, or else their reign will be tarnished with what would be seen as a great failure of cooperation and diplomacy. When Mrs. May says, “no deal is better than a bad deal,” she is not technically wrong – there are worse, hypothetical, deals that could be offered to us – but she is being deceptive in her stance. There must be a deal, less her position be untenable.

And thus we have a problem. On the one hand, we have a political landscape where right and left will be unhappy with whatever deal is eventually reached, and at the same time we have requirement to strike a deal, or get a new prime minister. Indeed, if after June’s election result Mrs. May did not see her position as untenable, there is little chance she will voluntarily walk to the hangman’s noose in 2019.

One might simply put it as, ‘how do you solve a problem like Brexit?’ Well, for many Leave campaigners Brexit was never a problem, but a solution to a great many problems. Sovereignty, the NHS, immigration. These were all sicknesses for which Brexit was the panacea. But the reality, at least from a Remain perspective, is Brexit is not a panacea, and this will be evidenced when, post-2019, these problems still exist.

If Mrs. May secures a deal that Brexiteers applaud, they may have to eat their words when these problems persist. Though they will not, for Mrs. May will not secure a deal that satisfies Brexiteers. Perhaps we will have a transitional arrangement, or retain membership of the Customs Union, or pay a large divorce bill. It does not matter. What matters is that Brexit must remain an issue for those on the right, less they admit their errors in calling for the UK’s exit of the EU. From a Brexiteers’s perspective, they cannot afford be satisfied.

2019 will not see the emergence of a post-Euroscepticism era in the UK; rather, we will bear witness to the rise of the Releaver. In the general election, the term Re-Leaver was used to describe a Remain voter who was planning on voting Conservative. But I suggest a Releaver is actually something quite different, and quite literal: someone who will demand we renegotiate our terms of leaving the European Union.

I imagine a phrase such as, ‘leaving the EU was right, but the way we left was wrong,’ to be quite a common phrase is 2019, when the problems that face this country persist and the EU, now no longer a viable scapegoat, must be recast in that role again.

For Brexit is a tremendously complicated issue, but the politics, at least in a pragmatic sense, is remarkably simple. As a country, we must now all be cautiously optimistic for the future, for what else can we be? But make no mistake, the infamous British cynicism will return, if indeed it ever left, and the whole Brexit furore will rumble on beyond our eventual departure. Mrs. May might believe no deal is better than a bad deal, but perhaps it is time we all come to accept there might only be bad deals going around?

Everyone's cross about Brexit

After the general election, Nicola Sturgeon is quietly bleeding. For all the respect I have for the woman, I do not want Scottish independence, and it seems much of Scotland agrees. She’s walking wounded. However, that didn’t stop her making one of the most sensible suggestions I’ve heard in a long-time: that Brexit should be negotiated by a cross-party delegation.¹

The idea sounds immediately brilliant. So brilliant in fact I have to wonder why is isn’t what we’re already doing? It sounds democratic, and representative and conciliatory. But that’s not what we’ve got.

Instead, in the furore and fallout of the 23^rd of June 2016, we got Theresa May. She capitalised on Brexit, perhaps trying to look strong and stable, later announcing what she thought Brexit meant² (Brexit, obviously…) and what her plans for the negotiations were.³ Some even began calling her Supreme Leader⁴ for her style of control.

And yet now we have a general election result which has destroyed the Supreme Leader in the most painful of ways,⁵ and it has (accidentally) thrown the questions of how and who re: Brexit wide open. YouGov recently did a poll which showed support for Mrs. Sturgeon’s idea (an idea, let’s be honest, that only came about because Sturgeon hasn’t gotten what she really wanted), with 51% of participants wanting a cross-party delegation.⁶

Now, 51% isn’t much of a majority, but considering Brexit is an issue because of 52%,⁷ I’d be hesitant to dismiss the poll quite so soon if I were a Tory Brexiteer.

That’s besides the fact that YouGov were one of the few pollsters during the general election that seemed to get anything close to the actual result.⁸ Indeed, we can criticise methodology sometimes – and I very much encourage people to do so – but right now YouGov are having their moment in the sun.

The idea seems sensible for another reason. If the government of the day must lead the talks, who will lead when we don’t exactly have a legitimate government? Of course, we can debate the word legitimate, and yes Corbyn didn’t win, but neither did May, or anyone else for that matter. Following Mrs. May’s own mantra, surely now she must cede some control of the talks to Labour, the SNP and others? Surely, a Brexit for Britain should be a Brexit that represents Britain, no?

But this will not happen. For the same reason that Mrs. Sturgeon’s current weakness has prompted her to soften her position, Mrs. May must harden hers. To cede any say to any other party, to give Mr. Starmer or anyone else (besides maybe someone of the Northern Irish⁹ persuasion) a seat at the table, or to make Corbyn look even vaguely legitimate as a leader, undermines her near hollow position.

For Mrs. May, the noose is already around her neck. But in the name of Tory preservation the party has stayed the execution. A cross-party delegation would almost certainly cause her to fall through the floor, and she knows it.

¹ https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/12/nicola-sturgeon-calls-for-may-to-pause-brexit-negotiations

² http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-brexit-means-brexit-conservative-leadership-no-attempt-remain-inside-eu-leave-europe-a7130596.html

³ https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech

⁴ https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/apr/30/kim-jong-may-awkward-and-incredulous-as-journalist-asks-question

⁵ http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2017/results

⁶ https://yougov.co.uk/opi/surveys/results#/survey/e066e170-4f56-11e7-8ead-1eb0da735179/question/0f1bd200-4f57-11e7-81f3-2ab0a50a8b9c/toplines

⁷ https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2016-brexit-referendum/

⁸ http://www.independent.co.uk/News/uk/politics/election-results-hung-parliament-exit-poll-yougov-latest-conservatives-labour-winning-a7780401.html

⁹ http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/815141/Election-2017-DUP-Theresa-May-Arlene-Foster-Brexit-coalition

So... Who Won?

Elections are like high school drama. You kind of hate them, but you also secretly adore them. Though I’ve got to say, this election might be the first I’ve found genuinely exhausting. I suppose maybe it’s because I’m getting old, or maybe it’s because it’s a nice day up North (that’s not a political nod to anything) and as I watch the coverage – eyes glued to the screen, obviously – the Sun is dehydrating me. Like the election, there’s a lot of things to consider.

Or maybe I should say blame. Who does Theresa May blame for what is most certainly a huge loss, but at the same time is technically a win? Who does Jeremy Corbyn blame for Labour’s indisputable loss that has the smell of victory about it? Who do the electorate blame for telling them there’d be a landslide victory, and (not so subtly) who do the TV pundits blame for giving them terrible polling results?

This is a weird election. I believe all elections can be weird, if you drill down into the demographic data enough, but this is weird because you don’t need to do that too much.

Let’s look at turnout, which was at its highest point since 1997¹ and particularly high amongst young people² (there is a figure of 72% doing the rounds, but as the BBC points out, there’s no reliable data yet). Lord Ashcroft published an article on June the 6^th noting that the number of Tory seats falls as the voter turnout rises.³ It’s worth pointing out that Ashcroft’s model predicted a Tory majority, even under high turnout scenarios – “The higher turnout scenarios, meanwhile, estimate a lower range of majorities,” so maybe Ashcroft isn’t the best go to guy to talk about turnout data.

The point is this – if the Tories knew that a high turnout would go against them, then, just from data alone, we must place some blame for the result at the door with all those people that chose to, well, step out of their doors and vote.

One thing that was in Mrs. May’s pocket, one thing she could rely on to win, was Brexit, no? Even I wrote on the 31^st of May, “If tonight's debate is about Brexit, Theresa May will win even in absentia.” Certainly, early in the night some commentators were finding comfort in the fact that Leave seats were seeing a smaller swing compared to what the Exit Poll would suggest, but one must ask the question: if the British public believed in a Conservative Brexit, indeed, if they believed in Brexit at all, why didn’t Mrs. May win a majority?

Some will bark that the referendum result shows the British public clearly care about Brexit, and others will argue that the collapse in the UKIP vote⁴ (from 13% in 2015 to 2% today) shows that Brexit was a trump card for the Tories. But that’s a reductionist view of UKIPers (I find that statement oddly ironic). In my mind, there’s three reasons for the collapse in UKIP. The first is the Hard Brexiteers have defected to the Tories, accounting for some fall in UKIP and some rise in the Tories. The second is that the (potential) rise in the 18-24-year-old vote essentially diluted the UKIP vote, and what we’re seeing isn’t necessarily movement (on this, I very well could be wrong. I’ve not been able to compare the raw number of votes to confirm this idea). The third is that many of those who voted for UKIP don’t care about Brexit.

This sounds dumb. UKIP, almost undeniably, were a one issue party, which was Brexit. Yet, as many in the media seem to forget, UKIP for the longest time were a protest vote too. And Brexit, in my opinion, was more of a vote against the establishment order than anything to do with the EU. So, when Theresa May runs on Brexit (and UKIP run on enforcing the integrity of Brexit), many UKIP voters just don’t care. She’s establishment, and some would argue, responsible for many economic issues facing the lives of that group. And Corbyn, the leader of the (still) second largest party, markets himself as outside the establishment, and importantly, as anti-austerity.

If Brexit isn’t as big an issue as the media and the Tories think, and austerity is the real creature that they must slay, then the picture quickly emerges of why the result was what it was.

But what of the media? They told us this election would be dull. There were murmurs of low election turnout;⁵ Brenda articulated in the most adorable when the sense of fatigue the whole country felt. And yet on the night (and throughout the election, let’s be honest) it wasn’t boring. In fact, little of what the pundits said turned out to be true, except for of course the Exit Poll, which many, “[couldn’t] believe.”

In fact, many of the pundits seemed so sure that no one saw that result coming. Except… YouGov⁶ and Survation⁷ saw it coming about a week ago. Now, to the credit of at least the BBC, they acknowledged that those two polls were bang on the money, and that they, with their commentary, had missed a trick. What was that trick? Well, both YouGov and Survation factored in a higher number of young voters than other polls.⁸ There’s that old stick-in-the-mud again.

I’m not going to say much about the Tabloids that, on both sides of the argument, were far too dispelling in their coverage. Nor am I going to linger on the problems the mainstream media had covering this election, in terms of being correct or being complacent. I can be accused (rightly) of both myself. And of course, the Exit Poll, YouGov and Survation were (to varying degrees) off in their predictions. But the media must realise that they’re losing creditability, and that’s bad for all of us. Did they play a factor in the election, perhaps as a whispering sound in Theresa May’s ear as she was walking on holiday?⁹ I think someone should be asking what role the media will play in the future.

And that’s about it. Well, it’s not. Theresa May was a disastrous candidate with a horrible manifesto, whereas Jeremy Corbyn was (by most reporting) a disastrous candidate with a popular manifesto; the Dementia Tax swung the polls more than Labour ever actually did;¹⁰ nationalism remained a prominent force, whilst whispers across the channel played their role too; “Strong and Stable,” repeat ad infinitum. I don’t see the point of talking about these things, because I don’t need to. Switch on your TV and absorb the analysis, with a free side of cross-analysis thrown in.

I’m trying to get to a point, and I think it’s this. Firstly, the youth vote (probably) swung this election massively, which is good for democracy, bad for functioning government, and a much more significant trend than it is currently being given credit for. Secondly, Brexit wasn’t the issue it was meant to be. That’s not to say it didn’t matter, but Brexit is derivative of austerity policy, and is not in itself the cause of political turmoil. Austerity (amongst other policies, such as Social Care) drove this election result; if anything, Brexit is this election’s cousin, not it’s father. And thirdly, the media got predictions very wrong throughout the campaign. Some will say the media was horribly biased; all I’ll say is it felt frustrating at times, and caveats exist for a reason – use them!

Anyway, I’ll see you in Autumn… (maybe)

¹ http://www.ukpolitical.info/Turnout45.htm

² http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2017-40220032

³ http://www.conservativehome.com/platform/2017/06/lord-ashcroft-my-election-models-probabilities-suggest-a-potential-conservative-majority-of-64.html

⁴ http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/08/ukip-heading-huge-loss-vote-share-2017-general-election/

⁵ http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/theresa-may-general-election-tony-blair-brexit-turnout-young-people-barely-democratic-a7691321.html

⁶ https://yougov.co.uk/uk-general-election-2017/

⁷ https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-election-poll-survation-idUKKBN18Y390?il=0

⁸ https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/may/31/yougov-poll-predicting-hung-parliament-brave

⁹ http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-snap-general-election-wales-walking-holiday-husband-easter-robert-peston-uk-prime-a7689046.html

¹⁰ http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/26/conservative-poll-lead-cut-half-dementia-tax-u-turn/

The Power of Glossy Ring-Binders

There are two economic problems in the UK. The first is that far too many politicians and members of the commentariat do not understand economics, and advocate (for the past 7 years) a fiscal policy that doesn’t work. The second is those that champion the opposing fiscal approach – what, I suppose, might be called Corbynomics – do not know how to communicate the rationale of their approach.

The issue in both regards is political narrative. Most would agree that textbook intelligence does not make one a savvy politician; it carries that the same is true in reverse, that one can be a savvy politician and academically rather ignorant. Political narrative is a broad statement, but for the purposes of this piece I say it means this: how one shapes facts, or mistakes, to suit their own political agenda at that time.

The reality is austerity is the kindred spirit of conservatism. Small government, low taxes, individual responsibility. Austerity accomplishes all those things. It also appeals to a very guttural concept of living within one’s means, running a country like a household – the Swabian housewife. It sounds so terribly sensible.

Conservatives utilise this economic strategy so well because it has a relatively low barrier to entry. It is easy for the laymen to understand, and it is hard to argue against without sounding crazy. Surely the way to reduce debt cannot be to borrow more money? That’s not how household finances work.

As an aside, the Swabian housewife strategy – known sometimes as the Swabian housewife fallacy – is what cost Mr. Milliband the 2015 election, in my opinion. (Maybe not, it’s hard to say). By running on a watered down Conservative austerity strategy, Milliband was embracing the fallacy, but doing it with a backdrop of economic discreditably (another fallacy; public debt under Labour was lower in 2008 than when they took power in 1997, it was only in 2008 when the financial crisis hit that public debt became ‘problematic’) which was never going to work. The Tories just make austerity look so much sexier.

And now enter stage right Mr. Corbyn, running on an anti-austerity economic plan. Of course, in the political narrative the Conservatives have shaped, Corbyn’s vast spending plans seem ridiculous – remember, how can you spend your way out of debt? But Corbyn’s strategy is the right one (generally speaking) because one cannot cut their way out of debt either.

Let’s return to the household analogy to explain. If you must reduce household spending to meet outgoings, you do so. But what if you get to the point where you can’t afford to eat, or heat your home, or pay the rent on your home (austerity, by its very nature, targets those that rely on the State more than those who don’t, so it will disproportionately affect renters more than home owners, so rent is, economically, a sensible barometer for this analogy)? Well, then the household no longer exists. Good job. I guess eradicating the household is kind of like securing it?

Austerity works when you have growth. In a recession – by definition – you don’t. In a stagnant economy (which, in my opinion, the UK’s is) you also don’t have growth. All cutting does, at least in the short-term, is shrink the size of the economy, reduce the level of investment, and reduce growth. When the financial sector is doing a good enough job of reducing economic growth, we don’t need the government to do the same.

Finally, if you want proof austerity doesn’t work, look at the UK economy right now. Brexit is a convenient scapegoat (or at least distraction) for many problems in the UK public sector, but it is actually a symptom of austerity. So too is the underfunded NHS, or the underfunded education system, or the underfunded police, or the underfunded armed forces, or the… You get the picture. 

After 7 years of trying this economic policy, is hasn’t worked, and for some, that’s a hard pill to shallow. But if aneconomic policy is failing citizens, then it is a failed economic policy.

Most people know this – certainly Corbyn does. That’s not the point of this piece. I said before there are two economic problems in this country. I have addressed the first problem, but now I must address the second.

Corbyn does not speak in terms of economics. Neither does McDonnell, or many of the Labour inner circle. Blairites speak economics, but their brand is technocratic and pseudo-conservative. Theresa May should not win this election. Basic services required for provision by government aren’t being provided, the Tory manifesto is rather unpopular (at least the less popular of the two major parties) and she has an ever-growing reputation as a flip-flopper. But they are winning, and even though as I write that gap is shrinking, they’re still winning.

Why? Because the Conservatives set out their stall in simple ultimatums. They present their version of facts and explain their ‘plan’ calmly in simply steps, all bound (I’m sure) in a glossy ring-binder. Everything they could be saying might be wrong, or a lie, but on their shop front it doesn’t matter – they’re attracting the most punters.

Corbyn needs to learn to construct a political narrative – a shop front – that does the same thing the Conservatives do. To some Corbynites this will sound like heresy. But if your product is good, and you tell people why it is good (maybe by utilising a nice glossy ring-binder and PowerPoint presentation), they’ll buy it. And they’ll buy it even more if it’s the only alternative to the faulty product that’s been on sale for 7 years.

The issue currently is that Corbyn doesn’t seem to want to be this type of salesman, to have this type of political narrative. He’s more than happy being the guy with the megaphone shouting about unbelievable bargains that people acknowledge sound great, but also think are maybe dodgy knock offs or too good to be true. Where’s my evidence for this belief? Just look at Diane Abbott and her policing figures, or Corbyn himself and the child care costs: simple mistakes that aren’t fatal to the campaign, but are wholly unnecessary.

I despise political narratives. But they’re how the game works. So long as our democracy is universal and not Socratic, they are a sad necessity. 

Suffocation

In the song, ‘Suffocation,’ by the band Against Me! there is the line, “Suffocation, Modern life in the Western world.” I suspect 21^st century world is more accurate, but I also acknowledge maybe that’s implied by the word modern.

In recent weeks as talk of Brexit has been building and the actual act of giving notice completed I have felt myself becoming disengaged with the issue, a feeling I hypothesise is not uncommon. The reason for this I think is quite simple; information bombardment. Though, even that is a misnomer.

In the film Anchorman 2 (a film I do not recommend, mostly because it’s shit) Ron Burgundy, relegated to the graveyard slot on a new 24-hour news channel, begins to report of the ‘emerging’ story of a police chase. The humour is two-fold, firstly in how it clearly is meant to mock modern daytime cable news, but secondly in how the ominous narrator explains how this absurd character and scenario was the origin of modern news today.

What Burgundy does in this scene is genius, and really, it’s fundamentally opposed to the modus operandi of a news station; he exploits the unknown. Now, from a viewer perspective we watch the news because we are ignorant of the day’s events, and the news anchors can inform us of the information we are missing. Burgundy, in this scene, flips this paradigm on its head by saying the news organisation themselves are ignorant of all the facts. Suddenly this becomes exciting, and engaging, and problematic.

It’s problematic because information only flows so fast, and doesn’t flow at all when there is nothing to know. In the modern 24-hour news cycle, there’s a lot of moments when there’s nothing to know. The solution to this problem is the aforementioned, ‘information bombardment’, and perhaps now you can see why it’s a misnomer; there’s no information to be bombarded with. Instead, the time is filled with analysis, and cross analysis and predictions and historical perspectives and counter perspectives and info-graphics and timelines and so on and so on, until something happens. All the while we, the viewer, sit there in a whirlwind of confusion and frustration and to an extent hysteria as we come to realise nothing, absolutely nothing, is being said.

In some ways, it’s just a supply and demand problem – there’s so much demand (air time) but so little supply (relevant news).

As an aside, if I were to suggest a reason for the rise in ‘fake news’ and clickbait, I would suggest it is from a desire to capitalise on this vacuous information environment, but that’s another discussion for another day.

This problem isn’t just a 24-hour news problem. Anywhere that we have access to information faster than that information can be provided this problem festers. Your phone and your computer are as much at fault as the 24-hour news channels. I suggest if you’ve ever felt yourself with a deep feeling of depression and self-loathing from a continuous pressing of that refresh button, this might be the reason. I know I have.

This is what I mean when I quote ‘Suffocation;’ we are suffocating in an information overload. Of course, this is maybe another misnomer – we’re actually drowning. The term ‘information diet’ is one I’m hearing more often and it’s taken the form as something hip and cool, but I do think there is a darker side to it, namely escaping the depression and self-loathing of information addiction. Cutting yourself off to make a change is one thing; cutting yourself off because you need to is quite another.

Here, then, we find the real problem emerging out of it all. The feeling of wanting to escape the info-sphere, to switch everything off, to go on an ‘information diet’ – this is the realm of disengagement. Sometimes we need to disengage our brains and do something different – it can be very liberating, spiritually and intellectually – but some issues are too important for us to willingly, and with exhaustion, disengage from.

I cited Brexit previously. This is a massive issue for my country right now. Trump if you are American, Le Pen if you are French, and countless other things I am – ironically – ignorant of, these are all important issues we as citizens need to be engaged in. In these past few weeks I have wanted to disengage, to stop reading articles and listening to commentary and talking to colleagues, but I’ve desperately tried not to. Most of what I read and hear and so on I consider meaningless, copious noise, but I still listen.

Sometimes it’s good to get away from it all – especially if you feel like you’re drowning – but sometimes you’ve got to suck it up (pardon the pun) and try to keep going.

A badly staged pantomime.

The battle raging in the supreme court regarding who has the authority to trigger Article 50 is more interesting as a pantomime than as a serious legal battle. Fitting, for December.

To be clear, the decision means little beyond political point scoring. If the decision were to go against the government, logic would suggest Mrs. May – and possibly Mr. Johnson – would look to hide a veiled smile. That is, of course, assuming the decision could stop Brexit… which it won’t.

In reality this case is about authority and seeming to be in control. Mrs. May – who has not won a General Election – has ascended to a cursed throne. Cursed for many reasons, but perhaps most notably because nobody expected Brexit, and by extension nobody seems to have planned for it.

Why else would May use such a meaningless statement – Brexit means Brexit – as the slogan of her new regime? It’s very utterance (the slogan) occurs only when a question should not or cannot be answered.

Let us assume the opposite for a moment – that there is a plan. Would the new Prime Minister keep it to herself and her cabinet, slyly avoiding questions and reiterating meaningless slogans? Or would she boldly deliver her plan, reassuring thee public of capability of Whitehall and proudly, confidently putting herself before any challenge?

This case is an attempt – partly – to expose the emperor’s lack of clothing. There are more nuances to it than that (it is hard to ignore the investment manager at the centre of all of this) but ultimately this is why Mrs. May will continue to fight. Set aside claims of negotiating position; May must appear strong in a time of crisis.

She must take a commanding position, rally the troops and all the rest of it. She must also recognise she may occupy the office of Prime Minister for what is – relatively – a short period of time. Brexit may well be Mrs. May’s only legacy, and as such failure is not an option.

Will this supreme court case lead to failure? Not in itself, but it may force the government to reveal their hand, or lack thereof, and provide us with a standard by which to judge success or failure. Mrs. May could fail to secure anything she wanted in the Brexit negotiations, but this failure could be disguised as a success provided the starting point remains unknown.

This is the long-term risk for Mrs. May. The short-term risk is the potential revelation that even she does not know the starting point. It would undermine her authority and her government, and would linger over her premiership perhaps indefinitely.

This case is a pantomime, but no one is shouting, “he’s behind you!” Instead, we might soon realise no one, not even the performers on stage, have any idea where ‘he’ is.