Western
democracies are desperately searching for Martin Luther. Following the Facebook
and Cambridge Analytica data scandal, the social media platform in particular
and tech giants generally have found themselves increasingly under scrutiny for
their data practices. Such scrutiny takes many forms: is Facebook a threat to
democracy?; are tech giants too big?; who has agency over our data?; and so on.
These are
questions that have always existed, not just for social media, but for all
private interests and indeed all states. There is little objective nuance in
these questions. New technologies have always altered the power of the masses,
and thus potentially threatened democracy; monopolies have always existed in
one form or another; agency has always been a very transient thing. Even when
existential questions about social media have been asked, most obviously in the
campaign to delete one’s Facebook, the irony has been missed on those who
distributed their rallying cries via hashtags, blogs and twitter feeds.
Luther, rather
than David, is the character whom many seek as we consider data in a more
critical light. We do not wish to slay social media; we want to reform it.
Social media reactionaries,
irony aside, do not actually want to delete Facebook. We enjoy the curated
information steams decorated in gradients of blue, the egalitarian means by
which we might show approval, and the undeniable efficiency of social media as
a means of consuming said information and showing said approval. Even the toxic
areas of social media – and the Internet as a whole – act as reflections of
social problems that exist without social media. At best, social media allows
us to peer into fringe groups with relative safety. At worst social media
allows these fringe groups to project their ideas outwards, protected by
anonymity, which whilst often detestable or uncomfortable, we should recognise
is a truth that might not have formally been identified.
Those that
believe retreating from social media is the preferable reaction may be accused
of suffering a similar belief that the power of invisibility may be gained by
shutting one’s eyes. Just because they no longer see the world change around
them does not mean change has stopped.
The question,
then, is what is being reformed? To take the above scrutiny, the rhetorical
questions that precede such outrage may be translated into two statements:
“Why did Facebook collect THAT piece of data
about me!?”
“Facebook did WHAT with my data!?”
These statements
represent either a shallower, or a deeper – respectively – understanding of the
age of data. It is for those who reject the quantification of the world that
exclaim the former, and not without good reason. There are legitimate causes
for consternation. Privacy is that of most notable concern, and just as we
teach young children not to talk to strangers, it seems good practice to not
wantonly share data with faceless companies which unravel one’s privacy and leave
oneself exposed.
When we realise
that we have been doing such a thing by participating in social media – as many
surely have since the Cambridge Analytica scandal – it is a natural reaction to
withdraw. It is not necessarily the correct reaction.
By deleting one’s
Facebook or Twitter, each of us might claim to be reclaiming some privacy and
authority over our data. But we forget that companies which collect our data
are companies, and insofar as they
offer a service we would like to acquire we must pay a price. If the
alternative is to pay a membership to these platforms, we would simply find
ourselves out of pocket, as well as digitally exposed. If it is to legislate
what data may and may not be acquired by these companies, that imbues a whole
miasma of regulatory back and forth, arbitration and conflict – issues which,
let’s be honest, the vast majority of social media users simply don’t care
about.
Concern for
one’s personal data security on something as individually innocuous as Twitter
or Facebook is simply arrogance – as a data point, we are all very much
unimportant. I will, however, return to this conjecture. The point is, for the
vast majority, the price of their personal data is a fair cost for the services
that the likes of Facebook and Twitter provide. When our data is used to
suggest interesting people to follow on Twitter, to organise social gatherings
on Facebook, or to recommend delectable entertainment on Amazon or Netflix, we
see the great benefit that the tech giants generally provide.
This brings us
onto the second statement. It follows quite logically that if the ‘THAT,’ piece
of data is willingly given to produce a better service, when that same piece of
data is used for an enterprise that is not a better service – the ‘WHAT,’
function – we will criticise the platform specifically, not the process
generally.
This is perhaps
the cure for the irony identified above: those that were calling for the
deletion of Facebook were calling for the culling of a bad actor, whilst
Twitter, Blogspot and others had done nothing wrong, and would have been
unfairly targeted if this irony were true and discrediting. But this is not the
point.
The point is
this reaction to the ‘WHAT,’ function is a more rational response as it accepts
the transactional nature of data and social media – that data is given only
insofar as it creates and improves desired services. When Facebook as the
trusted keeper of this data oversteps their mandate, or is lax in their
protective duties, or both, situations like the Cambridge Analytica scandal
arise. For policy makers, at least initially, this should be the area of
legislative interest.
However, this
simple model of social media and agency is incomplete, and not wholly due to
simplicity. Whilst for some the collection of data (THAT) is the point of
incredulity, for many it is the outcome of having given that data (WHAT). But
how does THAT become WHAT?
As stated above,
individually our data is not substantial. Most people understand this, hence
the emergence of Big Data. But Big Data is often an overvalued asset; social
media sites will gleam any and all data they can from us, and they will surely
have fantastical ideas of the services they might provide in the future (the
THAT and the WHAT, respectively). A specific example is Cambridge Analytica,
who siphoned the data of Facebook users with the intention of supporting a
particular election outcome.
Perhaps it is
unique to the Cambridge Analytica scandal, with its politicisation, or perhaps
it’s a condition of our data obsessed lives, but the scandal was not about the
THAT and the WHAT. Users had already given Facebook that data, and citizens
were already exposed to campaign advertising via the Internet and traditional
platforms. The scandal, I believe, revolves around the HOW.
It would be abjectly
unfair to place the blame for the scandal at the door of behavioural economics.
For the most part, Big Data analysis doesn’t really care why a person with a
particular set of data points is more likely to support one
candidate/product/idea as opposed to another. Big Data simply identifies the
pattern and targets the resources associated so as to match the pattern. Here,
behavioural economics becomes the far too fastidious an advisor, the consultant
who didn’t get the memo about going fast and breaking stuff.
As such, in lieu
of the Cambridge Analytica scandal, pillars of behavioural economics such as
nudge theory probably find more of a role as villainous underlings in targeted
news campaigns (the presumed resources of a political advertising machine) than
they do in deciding who will be targeted in the first place. Indeed, would the
Cambridge Analytica scandal be a scandal if people did not believe – rightly or
wrongly – that the efforts of the company were relevant to whatever outcome
they were trying to facilitate?
Possibly, but it
is much less clear than it might be otherwise. If the HOW of the matter is to
receive some blame, and be subject to some reformation, behavioural economics
may be as worthy of criticism as Big Data is. I find myself coming to this
conclusion on the Cambridge Analytica story: Big Data is the new corporate
sexy; cognitive deficiencies make us feel dumb. The latter should not be
forgotten because the former is a more palatable creature.
This point,
however, should not be conflated with the Cambridge Analytica story. That
circumstance is more unique; the tandem utilisation of Big Data and behavioural
economics need not be.
In an election,
everyone is a potential consumer. Whilst Big Data might be used to target those
more susceptible to a particular side’s advertising, for those who are
accidently targeted the message is not wholly lost – the message is just less
efficiently received. But for a commercial advertising campaign, where the
promises of bang for your buck may make or break a would-be Cambridge
Analytica’s business model, behavioural economics becomes more relevant.
Here, there is
no need to go fast, and certainly no desire to break stuff. On the contrary;
where the demands of Big Data are the maximum return from the number of
advertisements placed, behavioural economics comes to the aid. The manipulation
or exploitation (both controversial words) of ubiquitous cognitive shortcomings
may reduce the cost of accidental mis-targeting, whilst the framing of products
as defaults, offers as loss averting and the use of multiple ads to invoke
herding effects may make advertisements too effective for those already
considered susceptible.
In other words,
Big Data may tell us who to talk to, but behavioural economics may tell us what
to say. In this sense I return to the title of this piece; behavioural
economics may be the force that pulls the lever of Big Data. This is a logical
realisation I believe many in the field of behavioural economics will come to.
A nudge such as a default option effect is far from perfect; for benefits of
this nudge to be seen, a great many observations are often needed. As such, the
domains in which Big Data and behavioural economics rely are the same: across
populations.
Whilst the
discussion of this piece has been framed around a scandal, it is not my
intention to suggest either Big Data or behavioural economics are malignant. As
with the discussion of the benefits of social media, such an accusation would
be far too simple, and far too easy. But a great deal of the commentary on the
nature of data and its place in society misses the point: it is HOW we use data
that matters. If this discussion is to be had, I feel behavioural economics
must be included.
No comments:
Post a Comment