Our
response to climate change can no longer be about the lack of urgency, or
scientific limitations. Certainly, while some people remain to be convinced of
the anthropogenic nature of climate change, on the substance of its existence,
the majority are convinced. The only challenges preventing us doing something
radical and transformative in the face of climate change, then, seem to be
political and economic will.
We
should ignore the question of political will for now. This reasoning will be
elaborated on in due course, but put simply, politics often walks hand in hand
with economics, and so by understanding the economic picture, we can consider
the political picture in much more nuanced term. From the perspective of economics,
there are roadmaps towards tomorrow, and compelling reasons to travel. It is
here we should begin.
Let’s
be clear, the scale of economic transformation to prevent the worse effects of
man-made climate change will be huge. The governor of the Bank of England Mark
Carney, for example, highlights some 30% of FTSE 100 companies will be directly
impacted by climate change due to their close association with our present
carbon energy system. As Durand (2018) notes, in order to keep emissions within
the IPCC temperature target of a 2oC increase, fossil fuel companies
will have to leave unused between two-thirds and four-fifths of their
carbon-based energy reserves. In short, massive parts of these companies’
values will become, for the stake of our survival as a species, worthless.
Of
course, sometimes it is hard to have sympathy for large organisations,
especially those that contribute so greatly to environmental degradation. But
it is important to remember that the impact of these companies is not simply
environmental. Many millions of ordinary and hard-working people are employed
in fossil-fuel related industries, and part of our climate strategy must tackle
the question of how do we safeguard these people? Speaking of climate strategy,
obviously reducing the amount of carbon we put into the environment can’t just
be solved by restricting supply of carbon-based energy; we must also tackle
demand.
It
is from these two perspectives that much of this piece will revolve. The
question of jobs, both now and in the future, will be tackled, prior to and
following a discussion of energy demand. As one might expect, such ideas are
open to criticism, and criticism should be welcomed. As such, following these
ideas, a discussion of present and future difficulties is offered. Finally, we
return to the question of political will, illuminated to the economic
circumstances of which the question resides, and a tentative answer is offered.
It
is important also to recognise what this piece is not. This piece does not
consider, for example, the environmental consequences of industries such as
food production or rare-mineral extraction, both of which are closely linked to
greenhouse gas pollution, environmental degradation and resource scarcity. The
omission of these topics is not due to minimise their importance; rather, they
simply fall outside the general remit of topics discussed in this piece.
Furthermore, while many of those topics may fall into the catch all term of
something like a Green New Deal, and while the focus of this piece will largely
be focused labour and infrastructure, of which various GNDs concern themselves,
this piece is not a critique or analysis of any GND, though ideas have been
drawn from and adapted from, for example, Ann Pettifor’s work of a UK Green New
Deal. If this piece must serve any relation to such legislative proposals, let
this be as a broad and most certainly flawed introduction, rather than a
reflection. Finally, it seems important to reference here, due to the lack of
reference elsewhere within the text, climate refugees. Climate refugees do not
fall in any distinct capacity into the broad categories of labour or
infrastructure, and the issue is not discussed here as a result; yet, the
consequences of climate change, above all else, will manifest in human form,
and it would be questionable to emphasise the urgency of our climate response
without any acknowledgement of the human cost of complacency. Similarly, and in
what serves as the only major critique of present GNDs offered here, climate refugees
should be at the heart of a foreign policy chapter within all future GNDs.
Jobs, part 1
Immediately,
we should note, there are effective, radical, rapid and – given enough politicking
– political solutions to the question of jobs lost due to the decarbonising of
the economy. The old mantra of largely centrist/centre-left politics has been a
promise to, say, coal-fire workers redundancy followed by retraining. In
practice this is a solution, but it ignores so many real issues, hence why such
strategies retain the veneer of condescension.
Many
of these workers have been employed in these industries, perhaps doing the
exact same job, for several decades. It’s just unrealistic to expect these
workers will either a) want to retrain or b) have the necessary skills to learn
and transition to a new industry. To some veterans of these industries, such an
offer may even be humiliating, as society not only diminishes the value of
their work in the present but also seems to blame them for the problems of
today and tomorrow. Regardless of all these issues, these people must continue
to work for a time, as will many of those employed for shorter periods in these
industries. This highlights another problem, which is wage security. What good
is retraining if while retraining one can’t earn any money, or available
compensation is necessarily low, and the wages associated with alternative
roles (potentially skilled work earning a higher level of pay, but, given the
challenges outlined previously, likely non-skilled, low-paid work) is also
precarious?
We
have seen with the legacy of the mining towns what happens when industries are
allowed to fade away and inadequate support is provided. If, as will be
necessary, we need to end the use of coal in our energy network as fast as
possible, we will need a radical solution. It is here a simple idea is offered:
we guarantee to pay those employed in these industries their annual salary
every year until they retire, regardless of whether retrain and get a job,
simply get another job, or decide to give up work. The only requirement for
such a package would be to accept redundancy at point of request. This would,
essentially, be an industry-specific basic income, and it would have several advantages.
Firstly, it would allow those who do not want to retrain to simply not have to,
without the wage insecurity that would come with such a decision. Secondly, it
would support those who would like to retrain to do so and would open
retraining opportunities beyond those which the government could provide. For
example, a worker to go back to school, or start their own business. Thirdly,
it would ensure economic activity in the communities effected by the industry
closures. Finally, it would be an economically sensible investment, achieving
our aims rapidly in the short-term, while being a relatively small investment
in the long-term.
Thinking
of this proposal as an investment – which we should acknowledge is, given the
urgency of this matter, a rather dubious, cynical and unhelpful exercise – we
should be happy to pay individuals several thousands of pounds for the best
part of 40 years if that safeguarded the survival of the planet for the next
hundred or the next thousand. Compared to the upside, the cost of this scheme is
exceptionally good value. Of course, it would need to be funded. A 2015 IMF
report into government subsidies of fossil fuel companies found global
subsidies totalled around $5.4trn. Even a small portion of these subsidies could
be put into a wealth fund, managed to ensure its longevity, and paid out
regularly to those covered by the basic income scheme.
New Energy
The
economic problem of climate change cannot simply be tackled by ending the supply
of fossil fuel energy. While it is so obvious it seems silly to state it, state
it we must: our energy systems exist in their current form because they
facilitate our present energy demands. Furthermore, the dynamics of energy
demand, has two parts, namely how much energy we use, and how we use that
energy.
On
this latter point we should not linger, partly, and frankly, because this remains
our biggest hurdle in tackling climate change, and so there is little that can
be said beyond acknowledging this continuous challenge. Yet, it seems appropriate
to say something. Solar power, for example, is excellent during the day, but
during the night our energy needs must be met by energy stored in batteries,
provided, say, we are reliant on solar energy sources. Our energy storage
capacities are still insufficient to meet our round-the-clock energy needs
quite in the way conventional energy sources do, but as the World Bank (2017)
reports, we are getting ever closer to solving this problem.
A
more interesting point of consideration is how much energy we use. The
narrative of economic growth suggests that human energy consumption will
increase ad infinitum as our capacity to consume individually, and the number
of us consuming generally, increases. On the topic of population, there is
always a risk of facilitating ever more disagreeable discussions, and so it is
sufficient to acknowledge that as economies develop, their population expansion
seems to decrease, and globally, the rate of population increase appears to be
slowing. In terms of mouths to feed, both literally and as a metaphor for
energy consumption, there appears to be a maximum number we need to provide
for. Thus, then, we should concern ourselves with how much energy we can use. If
we each continue to use an ever-increasing amount of energy, it matters little
how many of us are alive to do so; energy consumption will still increase.
Or
will it? An important observation offered in Thorstein Veblen’s The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899) is
that consumption takes two forms, namely consumption over time and
materialistic consumption. Consumption over time is a rather simple concept. A
person who does not need to work because of their wealth can choose not to
work, and thus can spend that time doing something else. For Veblen, this may
have been hunting on an estate; in the modern era, this may be holidaying in a
foreign country. Again, in the language of Veblen, all consumption that is not
necessary to survival compromises of a greater or lesser element of conspicuous consumption; consumption
used to demonstrate one’s position or class within society. We all consume
conspicuously, but as Veblen noted, there is an absolute limit – and one that
is quickly reached – on the amount of time-based conspicuous consumption any
one person is capable of. We all experience the passage of time equally, and on
average we all have access to a broadly similar amount of time, in which part
is spent working, part necessarily consuming and part conspicuously consuming.
Ergo, for some, the capacity to ‘spend,’ their time (interestingly, perhaps
where the turn of phrase, “spend time,” is derived) is insufficient to
demonstrate their wealth, power and thus status within society.
For
these individuals, and for those for whom price mechanisms prevent time-based
consumption, the alternative, material form of consumption, becomes the means
of expression of one’s access to resource. But here, too, there is a limit. We
see it circumstantially during financial crises, where concerns over financial
stability cause many to become unnecessarily frugal. But we also see it in
accumulation, and in turn indebtedness. For those tremendously wealthy
individuals who, by virtue of their wealth, dominate corporate and political
narratives, there is literally nothing which they could purchase to adequately
demonstrate their wealth. Indeed, the frequent beguilement of many to the
desperation of the few to make just a little more money demonstrates both ours
and their inability to grasp the sheer level of wealth controlled by these
people, and the relative insignificance of any subsequent gain (or loss).
We
need not linger on wealth either; again, while an obvious statement, a person’s
ability to consume is limited by their ability to afford to consume. This, more
than above, is key when thinking about climate change, and humanity’s capacity
to use energy. For many, the limit of what a human could theoretically consume,
either in time or material, is less than they could afford to consume. Even
then, wealth, while crucial, is not the only factor impacting consumption;
there is also desire. We should, therefore, also appreciate the role of
diminishing marginal utility. As such, there may be a natural, if economically
determined, limit to the amount of energy any individual could utilise.
Considerations of the wealthy only further contribute to this idea; if
billionaires are to serve as natural experiments in the essential de-limiting
of one’s capacity to consume, we can see such an experiment would fail. Rich
people cannot consume all the wealth they accumulate.
Returning
to our demand for energy, it may be the case that in the long-term as economic
growth enables more avenues for consumption, the individual’s demand for energy
will increase, but in the short-term we might assume a plateau. And, in a rare
example of where the urgency of climate change is a good thing, we are only
interested in the short-term. Furthermore, an assumption of long-term increase
need not be the case if a revolution in the mindset of human consumption is
successful. For example, the society demands from those who contribute to
growth that said growth be carbon neutral or even carbon-reducing. In other
words, if the in-vogue thing is to
produce products that are environmentally friendly – which some companies have
endeavoured for many years to do – we may see a shift in mindset to one that
places production method and origin at the forefront of consumer decision
making. Finally, as organisations such as Degrowth and other elements of the
economic pluralist movement advocate, we might even abandon economic systems
built on perpetual growth and replace (or incorporate) such standards with
alternative, ecologically minded metrics.
Thus,
then, the question of dealing with energy demand need not necessarily demand
reduced energy consumption per se, and to do so would be dangerous, not only
from the perspective of restricting people’s liberty, but because it would
associate climate change action with economic stagnation or decline. The
transition away from fossil fuels will be accelerated, not hindered, by a
strategy that promotes it as a driver of economic prosperity, whether
prosperity is classical economic growth, some more nuanced re-alignment of
economic language, or simply the promise and prospect of higher wages and
better employment opportunities. So let us set the question of curbing energy
consumption to one side, assume that we simply need to reach a short-term
energy demand, and think about how we can champion such economic prosperity as
part of a green agenda.
Jobs, part 2
As
Ann Pettifor (2018) reports, the consistently low investment in UK housing
stock has left many properties woefully energy inefficient: “the UK ranked
eleventh out of fifteen European countries in terms of housing energy
performance” (Pettifor in McDonnell, 2018: 49). Similarly, in the US, figures
from the Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2013) for 2009 show that 47.7%
of household energy use was from space heating and cooling. Better household
insulation, the encouragement of the development of temperature regulation
technologies and legislating for proper insulation to be fitted to new homes,
or when homes are bought, would reduce household energy use massively, with
savings being passed to occupants. In fact, the EIA reports that household
energy use for heating and cooling is down 9.9% from 1993, in part due to
better insulation and more efficient home technologies.
Again,
this is something we can do, and something which national executives can do
with greater efficiency and long-term benefits than individuals may be able to.
Workers will be needed to retrofit buildings or build new properties where
those deemed financially unsustainable are demolished. These jobs should form
part of a work package that is offered to those made unemployed by the loss of
jobs in this decarbonisation program. Importantly having guaranteed income for
these workers, such jobs do not become stigmatised as degrading and charitable
work, but as a genuinely, socially valuable role. But we need not rely solely
on those left out-of-work. The nature of work is transforming across the
Western world, and many people are stuck in low-paid, insecure service jobs. An
ambitious infrastructure plan to retrofit homes and install green energy
technology should also include well-paid apprenticeships and training
opportunities which allow workers to remain important and skilful members of
the workforce long after the initial infrastructure spur has been completed.
This returns to the core of what must be our green economic message: no one can
be left behind.
But
the reform to the labour market cannot stop here. It is hard to imagine, given
any technological or social upheaval, what the future of work will look like.
However, we would be foolish to not recognise the rise of automation on the one
hand, and the consequences of decarbonising our economy on the other, will lead
to less or greater demand for existing roles and the demand for new jobs (the
question of whether these new jobs will be numerous enough to continue to
provide employment to many is beyond the scope of this piece. Equally, it would
be an oversight not to acknowledge this concern, and if one is interested,
elements of this piece already discussed such as basic income may become a
necessary part of our labour force strategy. Similarly, there may be
environmental benefits to facilitated unemployment, for example by enabling
time-based consumption rather than material consumption to flourish.
Additionally, embracing digital consumption practices, which go together with
the automation revolution, seems like a potentially environmentally beneficial
strategy).
These
jobs, from an environmental perspective, may include ecological and
conservation experts. The West runs the risk of the failures of past
interventions if, via military and economic means, we attempt to co-opt smaller
and emerging economies and those of the Global South to embrace environmentally
friendly development strategies. Part of an acceptance of the global challenge
of climate change must be an acceptance of ourselves as global citizens and our
nations as one within a group, rather than dictator and sub-ordinate. Faced
with the alarming prospect of climate change, it may appear justified to some
to intervene in the development and economic decisions of countries such as
Brazil to protect environmental entities (such as the Amazon rainforest) which
are not under our control but crucial to our own survival. This will not be
justified, however, and will serve only to accelerate us towards one possible
future, to borrow a phrase from Peter Frase (2016), that of barbarism. Better
it seems to advance solutions to this environmental agency problem which are of
mutual benefit to both those with sovereignty over resources, and those with
interests in the preservation of those resources.
An
educational emphasis on environmental protection, and a technical emphasis on
green technology and innovation, would position the West to be fantastically
placed to offer, on fair terms, consultation and assistance to emerging and
ecologically significant countries, enabling them to leap-frog, as they must,
the age of carbon-based industrialisation into a comparable age of green
industry. These ideas must surely form part of future international trade
institutions, which by their very nature already have an invaluable place in
any future green economic agenda, and must – if necessary – be supported via
comprehensive foreign aid provisions.
Scepticism and concern
One
might at this point, especially given what has just been said, hold a degree of
scepticism about the view taken in this piece. Beginning with the most recent
suggestion, for it seems the least divisive from a political perspective, one
might wonder whether what has been said is not terribly vague and superfluous?
To this, we should not deny this charge. It is important that much of the economic
response to climate change must be grounded both in the scientific evidence of
what is and will mostly likely happen and the technical knowledge of what can
be done within the necessary timeframe to achieve our desired outcomes. In
short, we should always place an emphasis on utilising tools available in the
here and now, on what technology exists today,
and on what data exists today, and
not on the maybe of tomorrow. In highlighting but not lingering on the problem
of battery storage, for example, or recognising it is only short-term
consumption which must now be of any analytical concern, this piece has
attempted to do so. Alas, then, the question of tomorrow’s jobs and the
future’s international relations belongs more so in the realms of futurology than
they do in the minds of today’s policy makers. The very nature of their answers
existing in the future is the primary contributor to the vague and superfluous
nature of the proposal, and this is unavoidable.
Yet,
as a wider consideration which, had we adopted this mindsight several decades
or several centuries prior (hindsight continues to prove itself wonderful),
would have mitigated the environmental situation we find ourselves in, we
should always endeavour to move forward not just with an eye to policy, but
with an eye to policy implications. Man-made climate change is the most
important issue of our time, but it is not the only issue, and while one might
be reluctant to admit as much for fear of diminishing the issue at hand, it
would be foolish to not recognise our environmental strategy will inevitably
become entangled in, say, the problems of automation or the problems of rising
inequality. An eye to the future, even if it is obscured by the distance we
still have to travel, is better than no eye at all, and a procession towards an
unknown destination.
We
should also recognise that the state, as puppet master or financier, plays a crucial
role in the ideas outlined here. There is a certain degree of inevitability in
the role of the state, being that climate change is a global problem and states
are our best example of accountable global actors. As part of a global
dialogue, states must and indeed have been the voice of their respective
citizens. The role of the state, at least diplomatically, however, does not
diminish a question of the function
of the state as part of a package to tackle climate change. The promise of
basic income, for example, may be best attacked not because of its practical
purpose within a wider decarbonising programme but because of the precedent it
sets. On this particular issue, however, we should have little concern, and
where concern is found, it should be in the branding (basic income) and not in
the substance of the policy. For example, such a policy should be funded from
subsidies world governments already give to the fossil fuel industries. In
terms of the political economy, then, the role of the state changes little;
instead of subsidising corporations that are soon to be defunct in a
decarbonised world, the state subsidises workers, who will still be capable of
making a contribution to society and who will still deserve as much access to
our collective future as anyone else.
The
defunct nature of fossil fuel corporations is, however, one of contention, and
indeed, within this piece, much has been said for the protection of citizens
and infrastructure, but not of the protection of corporations which, as stated
previously, contribute a significant amount of value to national economies and
the global economy. The question, really, is is it right for society to let
these companies fail? And, as some will believe, if these companies are not
destined to fail due to the power of the free market, is it not the case that
the free market, rather than the state apparatus, is sufficient and perhaps
preferable?
From
a very pure capitalist perspective, one should not shed a tear for the failure
of a company if it is unable to compete within an ever-changing marketplace.
If, as will soon be the case, large fossil fuel companies find themselves with
fossil fuel reserves which are now necessarily worthless, then that is the
natural pull of the market, and any exposure is the fault of those within these
companies who did not foresee this inevitability. If, on the other hand, they
did foresee this inevitability, and these fossil fuel companies endeavoured to
transition their business into one of Greentech and renewables research, that
would be a market-based adaption, free from the hand of the state, which should
be applauded. But not all innovation is fair innovation.
For
example, fossil fuel reserves which cannot be extracted for the sake of the
environment have a value in what devolves into a hostage like situation. It
would be irresponsible, though certainly praised by some, to simply adjust the
present subsidies such that fossil fuel companies are paid to not extract the assets they own. Such a
strategy may prevent further environmental degradation, but this strategy would
also protect the interests of shareholders and capital at the expense of
workers, who would no longer be required, and as a result worker communities.
Likewise, subsidising fossil fuel investment in Greentech has a certain
rationale to it, but it also feels tremendously immoral, an approach that would
be tantamount to a protection racket, like paying the arsonist to put out their
own fire. This is besides recognising that any such innovation shift,
subsidised or otherwise, would likely displace a great many workers presently
employed by the fossil fuel companies, and the state would still need to
intervene.
On
this question in particular, opportunities for the free market do exist, but
the result of any route leaves workers exposed. If such an innovation shift
occurs naturally within the market, we should offer no objections, but we must
focus our efforts on protecting workers, not capital, from the necessary
disruptive forces of decarbonisation.
On
the question of the free market generally, as with comments made previously, we
should not ignore the unknowns of the future. The innovation of the free
market, if one believes it more innovative than the state apparatus, may
produce in the future some technology which revolutionises our economy, society
and relation to energy. This may happen, and as the need for Greentech
skyrockets, indeed such advances probably will happen. But, again remembering previous
comments, the time horizons to prevent the worse effects of climate change have
shortened to the point of requiring action in the short-term. We can remain
optimistic about any innovative potential, and probably should, but we must
emphasis strategies that can be implemented here and now. As such, it would be
foolish to discount the free market as a potential actor in the decarbonisation
revolution, but equally, there is too little time for us to rely on it either.
Thinking of this another way, Friedrich von Hayek (1960) argued that the free
market maximises the number of experiments society can perform in order to find
solutions to problems, and as such always produces better solutions faster
than, say, the state, which can only attempt one strategy at a time. There are
be many rebuttals to this logic, but on the question of climate change, only
one rebuttal seems necessary; it is no longer necessary to find the most
efficient solution to preventing climate disaster, we simply need to find a
solution that works. Only then should we worry about optimisation. This is part
of the price we must pay for our prolonged deference on this matter.
This
lack of optimisation will take many forms and will undoubtedly cause setbacks
and the loss of reputational and political capital. One area where we should
proceed with caution, for example, is that of inequality. In retrofitting
millions of homes to better regulate temperature and with solar panels, we will
inevitably encounter the politics of the housing market and accessibility to
housing more generally. Resolving this issue is a creature und to itself, but
nevertheless, a blinkered approach will not be helpful. Again, the temptation
is to emphasise panic and the apocalypse for fear that legitimate emphasis on other
concerns would distract from the very real issue of climate change. But part of
the real issue must involve answering legitimate questions about housing
availability, housing quality and gentrification. Yet, even resolving these
problems, the process of retrofitting may still be plagued with the challenge
of inequality.
Time
is not on our side, and so it pragmatically makes sense to retrofit homes that
are the easiest to retrofit first, alongside legislating for high standards of
energy performance in all new build properties. Yet the properties that will be
easiest to retrofit will be newer properties, and those where the owners have
already invested in modernisation and efficiency improvements. This will likely
capture more wealthy individuals than those poorer individuals, who frequently
occupy lower-standard housing stock, or rent and thus do not have the authority
to invest in their accommodation. On this latter point, then, legislation
demanding landowners retrofit their accommodation may be a useful tool. But
beyond this, the point still remains; the pragmatic approach may lead to
investment in wealthy communities before poorer communities, with the benefits
of this investment being felt first by those who will benefit less from them.
Again, it should be emphasised that such a scenario is the product of our
present circumstances, and may be mitigated with intelligent accompanying
legislation, or may not even manifest. The advantage of raising such an example
now is two-fold: firstly, to acknowledge that the present solutions to climate
change are not perfect, but they remain necessary, and thus a lack of
perfection while necessary to acknowledge is not a sufficient excuse for
inaction; secondly, that we should be honest about the scale of disruption a
decarbonisation programme will bring about, and that there will be spill-over
effects into different areas of the economy and society we must also be ready
to tackle.
These
spill-over effects should not, however, be a rallying cry against the political
advantage of framing the decarbonisation agenda as one of grand narrative and
(inter)national mission, in favour of the technocratic incrementalism which we
have had for several decades. As the economist Mark Blyth recently stated, “no
one gets excited over a carbon tax.” Equally, as Srnicek and Williams (2015)
argue, disaster is not the impetus for enthusiasm. An unspoken essential of the
ideas discussed thus far has been one that does not threaten destruction and
degradation: redundancy for fossil fuel workers must be transformed into
opportunities which return agency to workers and does not infantilise them;
infrastructure transformation must be promoted as a great, society-wide
investment in our collective future; and international relationships must be approached
as a truly global affair that will continue well beyond our present
predicament, and will allow all nations to move forward together.
The Next Revolution
This
strategy of building the future,
rather than simply saving it, is a deeply political one. And it is the reason
why we must reject any intransigence for political reasons, and be bold in
proposing new economic solutions, even if – as is shown here – those solutions
require development. Political intransigence is often excused in the face of
seemingly unrealistic economic ideas. Yet there is merit in an economic
approach burgeoning on fantasy; indeed, it is often those fantastical ideas
that inspire the practical ideas of today and become the practical ideas of
tomorrow. But the ideas proposed here are not fanciful, far from it in fact. At
the core of any proposals given here is a recognition of the constraints placed
on our actions due to climate change, and a rejection of blind faith in the
solutions of tomorrow saving us. If the solutions exist today, we should move
forward with them, and if better, more practical solutions to climate change
emerge during the process of decarbonisation, that is a windfall we should
embrace. But we must abandon the idea of paying for inaction today with
tomorrow’s windfall; that policy is why we are in this situation to begin with.
Yet,
the promotion of political intransigence as a hurdle which must be tackled
before anything else has a modicum of truth. While it is true that grand
economic change cannot occur without first having the political will to enact
such a programme, it is also true that offering people hope, and selling
policies which directly suggest to the electorate not simply a solution to
disaster but an opportunity to thrive, is core to any politician aspiring for
power. The submission to the failings of political will is a self-fulfilling
prophecy; it is Mark Fisher’s (2009) There is No Alternative (TINA) argument
manifest in its most unhelpful and destructive guise. Necessarily, economic
vision must precede political action, facilitated by a whole suite of PR
strategies to sell that economic vision, and thus enable an effective polity.
If those economic policies naturally complement the PR message of hope and opportunity,
then we are embracing an effective political
policy.
It
is worth considering, however, what the alternative political narratives are.
As above, there are strategies to decarbonising the economy which should secure
favour from right-wing politicians: tax subsidies for Greentech investment,
government purchasing of fossil fuel reserves to ensure the asset base of
exposed companies, and – in extreme circumstances – the mass closure of
damaging (easily rephrased as loss-making following enough carbon taxation)
fossil fuel sectors such as coal-fire power plants. As explained above, these
policies, respectively, promote turning the arsonists into firefighters, turn
fossil fuel reserves into a hostage situation only fixed via socialisation, and
risk the devastation and abandonment of workers and their industry-dependent
communities. Indeed, the West’s response to the financial crisis of 2008 serves
as an excellent example of future potential strategies. And what must also be
said, despite the clear criticisms of such policies outlined here, is that
these policies are not beyond saleability, but such strategies would involve
the demonization of climate refugees and fervent appeals to national security. None
of these policies, nor the justifications of them, inspire hope and optimism,
but as time runs out, and thus urgency increases, it may be these unequal and
socially fragmenting policies which become our adopted solutions. Of course,
these not be.
We
need not reject these ideas simply on the basis of our dissatisfaction with the
world such policies would ultimately create, but because they would be
economically unhelpful to the vast majority of people. As above, income
inequality, corporatism and access to basic amenities for the poor are
important and vocal challenges facing our societies today. This is without the
pressing challenge of climate change. Promoting policies that tackle two birds
with a single stone – that marry investment with redistribution, that marry
retraining with genuine opportunity, that encourage mutual global relations
rather than technocratic, corpocratic and class-divisive relations – will
deliver prosperity to societies that adopt these policies. And, it must be
said, there is no tool better disposed to us for the propagation of an economic
and environmental revolution than by demonstrating to both policy makers and
peoples the success which might be achieved. Ultimately, this is why at the
start of this piece the politics was separated from the economics. We could
call on Bill Clinton’s famous political slogan, “it’s the economy, stupid;”
though, as we might expect, Keynes put it more elegantly, “look after the
unemployment, and the budget looks after itself.”
While
both these statements were made in rather different circumstances to our
present, the core message rings true: good economic policy will supersede
political intransigence. It is for this reason we should, baring a fair
appreciation of the challenges which face us, cast aside those who seek to do
nothing because they believe nothing can be done, and accept that we can solve
the challenge of climate change. Today. Now.
References
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Information Administration (2013) ‘Heating
and Cooling No Longer Majority of US Home Use’ [Online] [Date Accessed:
24/02/2019]: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=10271
Fisher, M
(2009) ‘Capitalist Realism’ Zero
Books: London
Frase, P (2016)
‘Four Futures’ Verso Books: London
Hayek, F (1960)
‘The Constitution of Liberty’ Routledge
Classics: London
International
Monetary Fund (2015) ‘How Large Are
Global Energy Subsidies’ [Online] [Date Accessed: 24/02/2019]: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/How-Large-Are-Global-Energy-Subsidies-42940
Pettifor, A
(2018) ‘To Secure a Future, Britain Needs
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Williams, A (2015) ‘Inventing the Future’
Verso Books: London
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Renaissance Classics: USA
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