This week at their annual developer’s conference Apple released
details of new software features aimed at curbing screen addiction. Such
features might be considered novel by some and a cynical attempt to avoid legal
action by others (Bradshaw, 2018 in the Financial
Times), but to some people – by which I mean me – this marks an important
step in the development of personalised paternalism.
Personalised paternalism is an interesting idea that exists,
at least in theory, as a response to the existing problems standard paternalism
in regulatory frameworks. Though, standard paternalism is a bit of a misnomer,
so let’s clarify some terminology first.
Without full details, it’s hard to assess how closely Apple’s
new software will be borrowing from nudge theory – a branch of behavioural
economics (which itself is a branch of economics with a good helping of psychology
mixed in) that focuses on adjusting (or, as some might argue manipulating. See,
for example, Rebonato, 2014; Arad and Rubinstein, 2015) how a proposition is
presented to a decision maker in order to influence their choosing of a
specific option (see Thaler and Sunstein’s Nudge
(2008) for more). However, some reported elements, such as time-usage reports
and mandatory downtime options, clearly have a grounding in the world of nudge.
The trouble with nudges, at least philosophically, is
primarily the question of who should nudge? We all like to think we make wise
decisions most of the time, but what if you were told you were often wrong in
your decision making? And further, what if you were told there was someone who,
at no expense to yourself, was willing to nudge you in the right direction?
When phrased like this, it’s hard to really be aggrieved at your benevolent
advisor. But think about it this way: what if Apple didn’t let you set the
downtime options, but instead decided that they understood your usage better
than you and chose for you how long you’re access to a specific app was
restricted?
This is part of the problem with paternalism (and it is
definitely paternalism. Nudges, typically, do not objectively limit freedom of
choice – there is some debate regarding nominal
freedom of choice, but that’s beyond the scope of this piece). Whilst both you
and Apple may agree you need and want to cut down on your screen time, and
whilst Apple may be better informed of how to meet this end more effectively,
there’s something deeply sour about this approach.
In nudge theory, the scenario is not so explicit. Say you
want to pick a pension scheme, but there’s a lot of information out there and
you don’t really want to trawl through it all to pick the absolute best scheme
for you (assuming you’re even able to do that). Nudge theory may advocate a
carefully selected default option pension scheme. The default option effect
states that when faced with a decision, people are more likely to pick the
default option than an alternative option. If the default pension plan is the
optimal pension plan for the average saver, then, so the theory goes, welfare
may be maximised by nudging people towards the default plan, rather than
allowing them to sift through all the information and potentially pick the
objectively wrong policy.
And for most people this system works. Whilst some argue
against this idea, conjecturing it’s not possible to know what other people
would choose for themselves (again, see Rebonato (2014), or, more broadly, On Liberty by Mill (1859)), this misses
a point: in some situations, most people will not know what is the best option
for them, and they’ll be happy enough to be nudged in the ‘good enough,’ direction (see Sunstein and Thaler (2003) who cite
Beattie et al. (1994) on this point). The stronger criticism comes in the form
of a question: can we do better?
This is where personalised paternalism comes in. The problem
with either the hard paternalism example of Apple setting the downtime options
or the soft paternalism of experts nudging people towards the best – on average
– pension scheme is that most people will still be left somewhat unsatisfied by
these approaches. Whilst the default scheme might be good enough, it won’t
necessarily be optimal for me as an individual. Similarly, whilst on average it
might not be wise for a person to spend umpteen hours a day on their phone, you
might be able to cope with the effects of screen time much better than the
average person. By adhering to averages, everyone will lose out – though some
more than others.
To get the best of both worlds, we would need to be able to
feed all our preferences, ideas and uncertainties into the system, and then let
someone else’s expert judgement determine the best course for us specifically (assuming, of course, you
want someone else making the decision). This is personalised paternalism, and
as we begin to collect more and more data about ourselves, the potential for
the theory to become realised skyrockets. Apple’s screen addiction software may
mark an important step in this direction. Here’s why.
Say Apple reports back to you how much time you send playing
Candy Crush every week, and you decide you want to cut down. You could specify an
amount of time each week you are allowed to play Candy Crush, and let the
software work in the background to keep track of everything. Perhaps in the
future this software might access data in your calendar to know when you should
be working, or your location data to figure out you like to play whilst you’re
commuting to work, and it will build your allotted time around these preferable
and not so preferable time frames? This might work fantastically, potentially
increasing productivity and making downtime feel more rewarding.
Of course, it’s easy to spin all of this as a positive and
ignore the negatives. If the goal of this software is to cut down on screen
time, is it really the best strategy to let technology coordinate more around your life? Additionally, as
I have argued before – following arguments put forward by Bar-Gill (2012) – even
in disclosure interventions (when a person is given more information to help
them reach a better decision themselves, rather than asked to trust the
judgement of someone else who has that information, i.e. a nudge) which the
above example is, there are still paternalistic aspects, and aspects that
infringe on freedom of choice. For example, if I was told how much time I don’t use my phone every day, my
feelings about how I should moderate my use will probably be different compared
to the effect of being told how much I use my phone. The decision of how to
frame information disclosure is a paternalistic act in itself.
Finally, we should always ask an important question: why do
we need it? Personalised paternalism supposes to make our lives better by
tailoring regulatory strategies and nudges to our specific requirements; but is
it right that we should feel compelled to regulate ourselves? Is it the
consumer’s fault that they spend too much time on their iPhone, or Apple’s for
making such an appealing device, or King’s for using bright colours and sounds
in Candy Crush? There is no absolute answer to these questions, but I believe
they’re important ideas to think about nevertheless.
I generally believe Apple’s announcement is a positive one,
and when we accept some form of paternalism will always exist, the ability to
have some control over it if we want is an important feature to have. But
paternalism, nudges and the agency question that surround both remain important
questions to consider, and it would be dangerous to see one solution as a panacea.
References
Arad, A, Rubinstein, A (2015) ‘The people’s perspective on
libertarian-paternalistic policies,’ working paper no. 5/2015, research no.
00140100. [Date accessed: 04/06/2018] [Online]: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ariel_Rubinstein2/publication/321161872_The_People%27s_Perspective_on_Libertarian-Paternalistic_Policies/links/5a129b3e458515cc5aa9e5a4/The-Peoples-Perspective-on-Libertarian-Paternalistic-Policies.pdf
Bar-Gill, O (2012) ‘Seduction by Contract’ Oxford University
Press: Oxford
Bradshaw, T (2018) ‘Apple
addresses screen addiction with new suite of tools’ Financial Times. [Date Accessed: 04/06/2018] [Online]: https://www.ft.com/content/e4048d90-6824-11e8-b6eb-4acfcfb08c11
Beattie, J, Baron, J, Hershey, J,
Spranca, M (1994) ‘Psychological determinants of decision attitude’ Journal of
Behavioural Decision Making, 7(2), pp. 129-144
Mill, J S (1859) ‘On Liberty’ in ‘On Liberty,
Utilitarianism and Other Essays’ (2015), Oxford University Press: Oxford
Rebonato, R (2014) ‘A Critical
Assessment of Libertarian Paternalism’ Journal
of Consumer Policy, 37(3), pp. 357-396
Thaler, R, Sunstein, C (2003)
‘Libertarian Paternalism’ The American Economic Review, 93(2), pp. 175 -179
Thaler, R, Sunstein, C (2008) ‘Nudge’ Penguin Books and Yale University
Press: London
