From
the perspective of many, on the one hand, and the perspective of non-Austrian
economists, on the other, neoclassical and Austrian definitions of monopoly
markets fail to address the question of barriers to entry in order to abolish
the monopoly. To an extent, both schools offer another solution – government intervention
– yet given the more limited definition of monopoly within the Austrian school,
as argued by Mises, this explanation is weak. Indeed, Mises specifies the
second form of monopoly is one established by government. With this in mind, it
is helpful to understand the respective monopoly models concerned here, before
proceeding further.
A
neoclassical monopoly may be found when a firm within a market has a price
elasticity of zero. In effect, they may set any price for their product such
that all buyers within the market must be price-takers. Of course, one may be
tempted to charge an infinite amount for one’s product in this circumstance;
yet as buyers may withdraw themselves from the market when given prices exceed
the buyer’s willingness to pay (given demand is characterised by a buyer’s
capacity and willingness to pay),
there exists instead a price effective for achieving profit maximisation.
Therefore, this monopoly firm will set prices at the point of profit
maximisation.
Within
the Austrian school, and as offered by Mises, the neoclassical definition of a
monopoly market is not a monopoly, because competition may eliminate the state
of monopoly. A classicist may disagree with this logic, arguing that high
barriers to entry will prevent competitors entering the market. However, the
Austrian rebuttal is that a market may not be a market without competition;
further, competitive advantage will always exist as monopolies do not have
perfect knowledge of the market they control, and as such they will forgo
profitable opportunities out of ignorance or error. This enables competitors to
lucratively enter these markets. Further to this point, an Austrian economist
might argue the presence of a neoclassical monopoly is not due to a lack of
competition, but rather because of
competition, as the individual who enters a market and is able to exploit a
monopoly of profitable activity has simply exploited knowledge and expectation –
which is to say out-competed rivals – that others have forgone.
Austrians,
therefore, draw an important distinction between entrepreneurial profit through
better knowledge, and profit achieved through the exploitation of an
Austrian-defined monopoly, which shall be discussed shortly. The reason such entrepreneurial
and better knowledge exists is because market participants do not have perfect
knowledge, as markets do not occur as equilibrium positions between buyers and
sellers, but rather are processes
that occur over time. For example, a supplier will not know their future demand
curve, and as such they may miss-price their product in the future. Such an error
may be exploited by rivals for profitable gain; further, such an error occurs
because of the firm’s uncertain expectations of the future. Given this
argument, Austrian’s dismiss the neoclassical argument of barriers to entry, as
they suggest sufficient competition always exists within neoclassical
monopolies (and all scenarios which we might call markets) to – over time –
eliminate such monopoly positions.
It
is Mises that offers two monopolies that may be deemed as such within the
Austrian school. The first are those monopolies that are created by the state,
and as such warrant limited theoretical discussion. The second occurs when a
single firm controls the entire supply of a demanded resource. In this latter
monopoly, it is argued, the firm may purposefully manipulate the supply of the
monopolised resource to establish the point of profit maximisation. Such a
practice is indicative of a neoclassical monopoly, and prompts the same
criticism as such a monopoly for not addressing the problem of barriers to
entry. Yet Austrians will argue such a monopoly is not a monopoly in the sense
that the Misesian monopoly is not a market, for no better information may offer
a competitive advantage to rivals, and thus no competition exists. Any gain by
the monopoly-firm is not due to entrepreneurial knowledge, but due to circumstantial
control of a resource that is demanded by some and that has not no substitute. Following
this logic, to argue the issue of barriers to entry is to define or misunderstand
this monopoly as a market – there is no competition, and thus no market, and
thus Austrian theory does not have to explain such a state of affairs.
It
is this paper’s argument, contrary to the logic presented above, that the
problem of barriers to entry may be solved for both the Austrian resource
monopoly and the neoclassical monopoly by considering the presence of
monopolies of demand, and invoking the notion of processive competition
employed by prior Austrian theory.
Both
monopolies offered are monopolies of supply, achieved by a lack of competition
and thus restriction in the neoclassical case, and by purposeful restriction of
supply of resource in the Austrian case. The result is that monopoly firms
operating in both models will set a price that maximises profit.
Yet
any buyers in these models will desire a lower price. This statement is
obvious, but may be mired in difficulty as buyers in monopolies must be
price-takers. However, following the Austrian school, firms will compete with
each other to gain advantage, with knowledge emerging over time. Such knowledge
may be that, for a firm pricing at the point of profit maximisation, the
withdrawal of a single buyer would result in a price position that will result
in reduced returns for the firm. This gives every buyer in a monopoly a
quasi-monopoly of demand. A buyer might gain a competitive advantage over
rivals by withdrawing their demand less the monopoly-firm lower the price of
its resource. Such action might be called irrational, as the refusal to
purchase a necessary, monopoly-controlled resource would result in the
ineffective activity (and potential failure) of the firm. This paper cites the
findings of Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986), who argue individuals are
willing to punish behaviour they consider unfair, even when at cost to
themselves, as justification for this line of thinking (also see Zajac’s (1996)
discussion on perceived economic fairness).
Irrespective,
if exploiting this quasi-monopoly results in the failure of the buyer before
the monopoly-firm must adjust prices in favour of the buyer, such attempt at
competitive advantage will result in the emergence of better knowledge for all
buyer’s transacting with the monopoly firm (it may also be a successful
strategy, though one cannot say that the exploitation of a quasi-monopoly of
demand will always result in one outcome or the other). This knowledge is that collective
withdrawal will force price-adjustment from the monopoly-firm (of course, such
certainty only occurs when all buyers threaten or do withdraw from the market;
so long as one buyer remains, there is a theoretical ground that allows for negative
– for the buyer – price adjustment to occur).
Such
action would turn the monopoly-firm into a price-taker, with each reduction in
the price resulting in a weaker collective position on the demand side. The
logic for this weakness is that eventually the cost of the monopoly resource
will fall to less than the cost of an alternative part of a buyer’s production
process, and thus competitive gains will be found in greater proportions, for any
particular buyer, in other areas. The monopoly-firm, in the Austrian model,
will increase supply of the resource – previously restricted – as a means of
maintaining profit levels prior to being a price-taker. In the neoclassical
model, such a shift will enable more firms to enter the market, essentially
increasing supply. Such a supply side response would be expected in a market
where prices fall. The collective response on the demand side, which may be
called the monopoly of demand, might be likened to collective bargaining within
labour markets, and is not a logical, coordinated response within the
neoclassical model.
The
comparison to collective bargaining within labour markets in certainly a fair
one, and indeed, perhaps serves as an exemplar extension to the Mises resource
monopoly. Certainly, it serves as evidence for the premise suggested here: that
no monopoly on the supply (demand) side might occur without the emergence of a
monopoly on the demand (supply) side to challenge it. Yet this paper will not
dwell on the labour comparison, for regardless of the theoretical approach
taken here, markets such as those for labour are multifaceted and so should not
be used as the sole comparison of theory. It is this multifacetedness on the
demand side, which may be called entrepreneurial or competitive rivalry in the
Austrian school, which offers an extension of the neoclassical model, which
should be addressed.
The
neoclassical model supposes that demand is determined by the maximum a buyer is
willing to pay. It is, therefore, a fallacy in this model to argue a buyer
might decide that the price they are willing to pay is not a price they are willing to pay. It is Austrian arguments of
time and competition that address this issue: a buyer’s demand for a product at
a certain price might only be stable so long as there are other forms of
competitive advantage that offer greater returns to be realised. As these
returns are realised over time – in part because demand side coalitions may
need time to form and effectively lobby – the demand curve, even at stationary
prices, will vary over time. It is this logic that explains why an acceptable
price for a buyer may simultaneously not be an acceptable price – because there
are alternative costs that are more important to address presently.
This
paper has briefly offered an adjustment to the neoclassical notion of monopoly
by utilising tools espoused in the Austrian school of economics. In doing so,
this paper has offered an address of the barriers to entry criticism of the
Mises resource monopoly, with respect to the address already offered by the
Austrian school. This paper has argued that all monopolies face the emergence
of a counter-monopoly that rectifies the original monopoly position. This
counter-monopoly emerges due to competition that occurs in other markets. This
logic holds for the neoclassical theory of monopoly if a temporal element is
added to the evaluation of the demand curve, and addresses the Mises resource
monopoly by suggesting competition on the demand side substitutes for the supply
side competition, challenging the monopoly firm.
References
Kahneman,
D, Knetsch, J, Thaler, R (1986) ‘Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking:
Entitlements in the Market’ The American
Economic Review, 76(4), pp. 728-741
Kirzner,
I (1998) ‘The Driving Force of the Market: The Idea of “Competition” in
Contemporary Economic Theory and in the Austrian Theory of the Market Process’ In Prychitko, D (ed.) ‘Why Economists Disagree.’ 1st
ed. Albany New York: State University of New York
Zajac,
E E (1996) ‘Perceived Economic Justice: The example of public utility
regulation’ In Peyton Young, H (ed.) ‘Cost Allocation: Methods, Principles and
Applications.’ Amsterdam: North-Holland.